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Executive Summary  
As the Research Triangle Foundation proceeds to implement its 2011 Master Plan for the 
Research Triangle Park (RTP), the Global Convergence Center will likely play an important role 
as a centerpiece and symbol for the park.  The Foundation envisions the Convergence Center as 
a campus for cutting-edge, collaborative research that serves as a common ground where 
Triangle university researchers can work together.  In addition to building RTP’s reputation as a 
premier research hub in both the United States and the world, the Convergence Center could 
contribute to local economic development by leading to entrepreneurial spin-offs from the 
research conducted at the center.   
 
This paper seeks to help answer what the Research Triangle Foundation can do to develop a 
center that is cutting-edge, collaborative, and draws on local talent.  We explore three case 
studies: the MIT Media Lab, multi-university teams, and RTI International.  The MIT Media Lab 
serves as an example of cutting-edge research.  The study of multi-university teams provides 
insight on effective collaboration, and RTI International serves as an example of how an 
organization attracted local talent.  These case studies point to some best practices that may 
guide the Foundation’s design of the Convergence Center.    
 
Best Practices: 
1. Select a leader for the Convergence Center that has deep relationships with the Triangle 
universities and has worked across academia and industry.  
2. Develop a unifying vision for research that the Convergence Center will host.  
3. Ensure researchers and administrators have ample opportunity to develop relationships with 
industry.  
4. Reduce faculty concern about working with industry by creating processes that match faculty 
interests with market or industry needs.  
5. Reduce and eliminate the organizational boundaries that researchers must work across. 
6. Recruit diverse teams from uncommonly grouped areas of research. 
7. Recruit prestigious researchers and leverage their reputation to attract more talent and 
research dollars. 
8. Ensure that the Global Convergence Center offers a unique research opportunity that cannot be 
found at local universities. 
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Introduction 
As the Research Triangle Foundation implements its long-term strategic plan for the Research 
Triangle Park (RTP), the proposed Global Convergence Center will undoubtedly play an 
important role as a centerpiece and symbol for the future of the park.  In partnership with the 
Research Triangle Foundation, The Triangle Universities Center for Advanced Studies Inc. 
(TUCASI), has driven the vision for the Global Convergence Center.  TUCASI envisions the center 
as a campus that would create opportunities for “interaction, discovery, and a collision 
between world-class thinkers and doers,” and offer spaces for labs, start-ups, and venture 
capitalists.1  At the center, multi-disciplinary, multi-institutional teams could work on large 
problems like clean tech, food and water challenges, and the management of big data.  Smedes 
York, chair of the TUCASI Board of Trustees, emphasizes that the convergence center will be 
complementary to TUCASI organizations.2   In the words of the TUCASI white paper on the 
center: 
It will cement the historic and vital role of the universities as the Park’s true 
value proposition and serve as a powerful magnet to attract new companies, 
leading innovators, and engaged scholars to the state.3   
 
Beyond creating new avenues for research collaboration, the Global Convergence Center can 
also serve as a physical symbol of RTP and an asset that makes the Triangle universities more 
competitive for federal funding.  Bob Geolas, CEO of the Research Triangle Foundation, board 
member of TUCASI and key supporter of Project Archie, hopes for a powerful symbol.  He 
imagines a center that is “a mix between a Guggenheim, a World’s Fair and the Epcot Center.  
You’ll have something unlike anything anyone is doing in the world today.”4  He imagines a 
place where researchers work alongside scientists from RTP companies to address far reaching 
problems like solar energy.5   
 
                                                          
1 TUCASI, Inc. “Project Archie.” White paper. [No date available]. 
2 Ohnesorge, Lauren. “Convergence center in middle of RTP’s extreme makeover.” Triangle Business Journal. 
September 27, 2013. 
3 TUCASI, Inc. “Project Archie.” White paper. 
4 Ohnesorge, Lauren. “Convergence center.” 
5 Ibid. 
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By combining research strengths of local universities and companies, Geolas believes the 
convergence center can create a symbiotic relationship for the universities.  Geolas points out 
that UNC does not have an engineering program, but NCSU does.  On the other hand, NCSU 
does not have a medical department but UNC does.  The ability to leverage each institution’s 
strengths to fill gaps like these makes the center even more important.6  Moreover, the ability 
to cite multiple universities and third parties like RTP companies on federal grant applications 
will make will increase Triangle applicants’ chances of winning government dollars.  Joseph 
DeSimone, director of UNC’s Kenan Institute, board member of the Foundation, and 
preeminent university scientist, reinforces this message: “we have got to make it easier for our 
faculty to come together, to team, so that we can be competitive in Washington for federal 
research dollars.”7 
 
Today, the challenge for RTF is to identify how to get there—which brings us to this paper’s 
policy question.  What can the Research Triangle Foundation do to develop a research center 
that is cutting-edge, collaborative, and draws on local talent?  The Methods section will discuss 
how we chose to answer that question.  The Case Studies section will explore the MIT Media 
Lab, the literature on multi-university research teams, and the birth of RTI International.  The 
Best Practices section will highlight lessons learned from these case studies.  The Conclusion 
will discuss next steps and remaining questions.    
 
  
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
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Methods 
To answer this policy question, we chose to focus on comparable organizations for examples of 
cutting edge-research, collaboration, and leveraging local talent.  The literature on co-located 
multi-university collaborative research centers is scarce.  It’s challenging to find information on 
what these centers should look like or how their success should be measured.  If we add to our 
search through the literature an additional filter—that we would like studies on physical multi-
university collaborative centers that aim at entrepreneurial spin-offs, innovative research, and 
maintains an identity similar to RTP—then the literature is even scarcer.  Therefore, we thought 
it best to approach this challenging question through a broader lens of understanding the 
stories of other organizations that mimic the center’s intended traits (i.e. cutting-edge, 
collaborative, and local) and then to draw out insights.  These insights, grouped as Best 
Practices, are simply lessons that we found useful, but don’t necessarily conclude all the 
insights from these studies.   
 
The three case studies are on the MIT Media Lab, the literature on multi-university research 
teams, and the birth of RTI International.  The MIT Media Lab represents a great example of a 
center that conducts cutting-edge and multi-disciplinary research.  The literature on multi-
university research teams provides a good view of the challenges teams face when 
collaborating across organizational boundaries.  Finally, the birth of RTI International is an 
important story to explore because like the Convergence Center it relied on relationships with 
local universities to grow and expand.   
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Case Study 1—MIT Media Lab 
In this first case study, we will explore the birth of MIT’s storied Media Lab.  Founded in 1985, 
the MIT Media Lab is dedicated to creating disruptive technologies by “actively promoting a 
unique, antidisciplinary culture…[that] goes beyond known boundaries and disciplines, 
encouraging the most unconventional mixing and matching of seemingly disparate research  
areas.”8  The Media Lab has an annual operating budget of about $45 million, has 28 associated 
principal investigators and faculty, 146 associated graduate students (66 PhD, 80 Master’s), and 
offers a graduate concentration in Media Arts and Sciences.9  In the spirit of anti-disciplinary 
learning, graduate students must take a mix of classes like epistemology, holography, signal 
processing, filmmaking, experimental psychology, and computer science.10  The lab tries to ask 
questions that haven’t been thought of but that could greatly improve how “people live, learn, 
express themselves, work, and play.”11  Today, the lab works on more than 350 projects under 
25 research groups.12  Directors lead research groups, which have names like Design Fictions, 
High-Low Tech, Civic Media, and Opera of the Future.13  The Media Lab has also successfully 
produced many spin-offs, some of which are well-known like BuzzFeed and Elance.14 
 
The MIT Media Lab represents an example of a leader in unique, cutting-edge research.  We’ll 
examine the beginnings of the MIT Media Lab to understand what it took to get it off the 
ground.  The Media Lab provides lessons in the importance of leadership, vision, industry 
relationships, and faculty culture. 
 
The leader behind MIT’s Media Lab: Nicholas Negroponte 
The Media Lab’s 24 year pursuit of a unique brand of innovation began in 1985, with its founder 
Nicholas Negroponte.  Growing up in New York as the son of a Greek shipping magnate, 
                                                          
8 MIT Media Lab, “About,” <http://www.media.mit.edu/about>. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Stewart Brand, The Media Lab: inventing the future at MIT, p.11 
11 MIT Media Lab, “About.” 
12 Ibid. 
13 MIT Media Lab, “Group Projects,” <http://www.media.mit.edu/research/groups-projects>, see Appendix A for 
full listing of research groups. 
14 MIT Media Lab, “Spin-offs,” <http://www.media.mit.edu/sponsorship/spin-offs>. 
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Negroponte was exposed to business leadership at an early age.  He is also just one person in a 
family of very accomplished persons.  His brother, John Negroponte is a former US Deputy 
Secretary of State, and his other brother, Michael Negroponte, is an Emmy-award winning film 
maker.15   Nicholas Negroponte obtained his undergraduate and master’s degrees in 
architecture from MIT,16 and in 1966, MIT accepted him to a faculty position.  The following 
year, he began MIT’s Architecture Machine Group.17  The Media Lab grew out of the 
Architecture Machine Group and today, still remains under MIT’s School of Architecture and 
Planning.18   
 
In 1980 Nicholas Negroponte and Jerome Wiesner, former Science Advisor to President 
Kennedy and former President of MIT (1971-1980), developed the original idea for the lab.19  
When the Media Lab opened its doors at the Wiesner Building in 1985,20 Negroponte became 
the director of the Lab.  In Stewart Brand’s 1988 book, The Media Lab: Inventing the Future of 
MIT, Brand describes Negroponte as breaking the mold for a faculty director.  Brand narrates 
how Negroponte was equally comfortable in both academic and business worlds.  Negroponte 
was an “amphibian” giving “value to both worlds, taking an amphibian’s advantage in both 
worlds.”21 He could hobnob with CEOs, chairmen of large corporations, and executives from 
government research offices.22 He was a road warrior who, along with Jerome Wiesner, spent 
months out of the year demoing and selling the concept of the Media Lab to potential 
sponsors.23  Negroponte had a unique branding in the two worlds.  In a university setting, he 
had the polish of a jet-setting executive and the drive of a hard-charging businessman.24  In 
business settings, he was the esteemed scholar, representing the intellectual perspective of the 
                                                          
15 Wikipedia, “Nicholas Negroponte,” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_Negroponte>. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 MIT Media Lab, “MIT Media Lab,” Facebook, <https://www.facebook.com/mitmedialab/info>. 
19 MIT Media Lab, “MIT Media Lab,” Facebook, and Wikipedia, “Jerome Wiesner,” 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerome_Wiesner>. 
20 See Wiesner Building in Appendix-B 
21 Brand, p.6-7 
22 Ibid. 
23 Brand, p.6-7,11 
24 Brand, p.6-7 
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prestigious engineering university.25  Through years of road shows, Negroponte and Wiesner 
were finally able to generate funds needed to establish the lab.26 
 
The convergence model and the lab’s initial projects 
By 1987, the Media Lab took on more structure and comprised 11 groups.  In this first 
generation of Media Lab initiatives, the Lab’s groups and projects strongly reflected its vision.  
Brand describes Negroponte’s vision as a model of convergence.27  Negroponte used the model 
as a marketing symbol.  It consisted of 3 circles, with the circles titled, computers, broadcasting, 
and publishing.28  Looking into the future, Negroponte said: 
We foresaw the coming together of these three industries, which previously 
were completely distinct…We saw the richest and most promising areas of 
research and development at their intersections.  One of the goals of the Media 
Lab was to deal deliberately with the middle intersection, where you couldn’t 
find much that was successful yet.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negroponte demo’ed the convergence model in his roadshow before the inception of the 
Media Lab, and he viewed this intersection as fertile for research—predicting that the circles 
would converge over time.30  Ideally, the Lab would jump ahead of others in finding the 
intersections. 
 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 Brand, p.11 
27 Brand, p.10 
28 Ibid. 
29 Brand, p.10-11 
30 Hugh Dubberly, “Extending Negroponte’s Model of Convergence,” Interactions, p.74-75 
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Another important dimension of the vision and culture of the Lab was its “demo or die” spirit.31  
In academia, the mantra of a budding researcher is “publish or perish.”  Obtaining a tenured 
position in a university is based on prolific or high visibility in publishing research.  At the Media 
Lab, researchers certainly write books and papers, yet the litmus test of success is not 
publication.  The researcher or team must demonstrate their idea through a real performance 
or else risk losing resources to other researchers.32  The Lab is more about application and 
invention and less about pure scholarship.33  The Lab finds that visiting representatives from 
industry are more attracted to the type of technology that they can see, feel, and be dazzled by.  
Thus, in addition to its anti-disciplinary culture, the Media Lab’s “demo or die” trial-by-fire is 
another way it creatively reframes how institutions address the interaction between research 
and the real world.34 
 
In the chart below, we outline the project groups that Brand identified.35  Although the projects 
represent a wide variety of topics, they are thematically unified by Negroponte’s media 
convergence model.  The period of sponsorship also varied from extending over a year to 
others that could be more than five years. 
 
 Project Sponsorship Example 
1 Electronic publishing $1M IBM electronic books 
2 Speech 
$500K DARPA, Nippon Telephone 
and Telegraph 
phones that recognize 
callers 
3 
Advanced Television 
Research Program 
$1M ABC, NBC, PBS, 3M etc. 
TVs with computer 
intelligence 
4 Movies of the Future 
$1M Warner Bros, Columbia, 
Paramount 
digitization of movies 
                                                          
31 Brand, p.4 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Brand, p.15 
35 Brand, p.12-13 
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5 
Visible Language 
Workshop 
$250K Polaroid, IBM, others 
cure the ugliness of 
computer graphics 
and design 
6 Spatial Imaging $500K GM, DARPA holography 
7 
Computers and 
Entertainment 
$300K artificial intelligence 
8 
Animation and Computer 
Graphics 
$300K NHK and Bandai 
real-time computer 
animation 
9 Computer Music 
$150K System Development 
Foundation 
music cognition 
10 School of the Future 
$1M IBM, LEGO, Apple, MacArthur, 
NSF 
computers in grade 
school 
11 Human-machine Interface $200K DARPA, NSF, Hughes 
machines that read 
lips and eyes 
 
This project list demonstrates the great extent to which industry was involved with supporting 
the work of the Media Lab.  Due in no small part to Negroponte, the Lab was able to foster 
deep relationships with companies across major industries.  Companies bought into the pay-
for-research proposition because Negroponte’s salesmanship convinced them of the business 
value in the Lab’s anti-disciplinary research.   
 
MIT builds industry relationships 
Negroponte and Wiesner were the stalwarts behind the Lab’s industry sponsorships.  As long-
time faculty and administrators, they were experienced in how the larger university built 
relationships with industry.  In University-Industry Partnerships in MIT, Cambridge, and Tokyo; 
Storytelling across boundaries, Sachi Hatakenaka describes MIT’s deep relationships with 
government and industry.  The university—not just the Media Lab—encourage its professors to 
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spend up to 20% of their time toward external consulting or other lucrative endeavors.36  This 
policy allows faculty to build a broader set of touch points with industry, laying the groundwork 
for future collaboration and sponsorship.  The faculty’s industry connections would lead them 
to roles like serving on the board of directors for companies and accepting full-time 
opportunities to work in industry research.37  In essence, faculty who crossed the university-
industry boundary helped create deep relationships with private sector research.  These 
relationships led to new collaborative opportunities like partnerships, consortia, and strategic 
alliances, which further enhanced boundary-crossing by introducing other faculty to industry.38 
 
At the same time, MIT administrators play a critical role in building relationships with industry.  
According to Hatakenaka, professional administrators play the role of creating a “template” for 
industry relationships—meaning structures like strategic alliances or consortia that can be 
replicated and repeated.39 Oftentimes the best type of professional administrator is one who 
also has background as a researcher.  MIT’s professional administrators frequently begin as 
researchers and then transition to administrative leadership.40  Having lived research, they 
speak the language of researchers and understand their environment, making them capably 
disposed to connecting administration with faculty.  Administrators at MIT tend to play 3 
specific roles in developing relationships: they managed external boundaries; they replicated 
lessons learned from one situation to another; and they focused on scaling up projects.41  One 
example of a success was an administrator who was recruited to MIT in the early 1990s as a 
corporate relations officer.42  He had around 20 years of research and development experience 
at a technology company and was an active alumnus from MIT.43  The administrator, who is not 
named, became a hero in terms of developing corporate relations because of his background 
                                                          
36 Sachi Hatakenaka, University-industry partnerships in MIT, Cambridge, and Tokyo: storytelling across 
boundaries, p.6 
37 Hatakenaka, p.108 
38 Ibid. 
39 Hatakenaka, p.110 
40 Ibid. 
41 Hatakenaka, p.109 
42 Hatakenaka, p.99 
43 Ibid. 
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with his technology company, his personal connection to MIT, and his larger familiarity with the 
culture and organization of MIT.44 
 
Indeed, the 1990s was a testament to his and other administrators’ work in developing 
relationships.  The chart below illustrates how MIT was able to enter into collaborations over 6 
years that would lead to over $250 million of industry funding.45 
 
Year Company 
Amount 
(millions) 
Period 
(years) 
Benefits 
1994 Amgen $30 10 Brain and cognitive science research 
1997 Merck $15 5 Brain and cognitive science 
1997 Ford $20 5 All MIT 
1998 NTT $18 5 
Artificial Intelligence Lab, Computer 
Science Lab 
1999 Merrill Lynch $20 5 Sloan Business School, engineering 
2000 DuPont $35 5 
Chemical and biomedical engineering, 
biology, 
1999 Microsoft $25 5 All MIT 
2000 Nanovation $90 5 Microphotonic Center 
2000 Hewlett-Packard $25 5 All MIT 
 Total $278   
 
With so much collaboration between industry and university, it was also important to match 
university and industry research cultures as well as earn support from executive leadership.  
Although the data above demonstrate the successful results of collaborative ventures, not 
every effort ended in success.  Hatakenaka notes that many examples of collaborations were 
                                                          
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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negotiated between university and industry but later dissolved.46  In some cases, a strategic 
alliance dissolved because the industry sponsor lacked a research culture.47  In other cases, a 
match between the corporate research activities and faculty research interests was too difficult 
to find.48  Yet in other cases, despite executive endorsement of the strategic alliance, there 
wasn’t enough endorsement from the research and development arm of the corporation.49  
Thus lack of alignment between corporate and academic leadership and research groups often 
threatened failure. 
 
Getting faculty onboard 
Faculty in academic institutions tend to be critical of collaborations with industry, fearing undue 
corporate influence.50  To assuage these concerns, MIT administrators had to develop a 
mechanism that would suitably match faculty interest with industry interest—thereby reducing 
faculty fears of losing autonomy.51  MIT’s solution was to rely on a proposal-based system, 
where no researcher would be forced to march down a specific route.52  Individual researchers 
would submit proposals to a committee consisting of corporate and MIT representatives, which 
would then assess its potential.  Faculty also worried what would happen if a corporate sponsor 
unpredictably withdrew out of a collaboration.53  MIT addressed this concern by writing 
contingency clauses into agreements that protected researchers from unexpected corporate 
exits.54 
 
Co-location also turned out to be important to faculty.  One MIT researcher commented on his 
experience in working with an external counterpart.  He says: 
It’s definitely best to have a visiting scientist here (with whom) we can be 
collaborating on a day-to-day basis.  It’s so much easier when you can walk down 
                                                          
46 Hatakenaka, p.101 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Hatakenaka, p.100 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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the hall, and not only that, it’s so much better when you’re working on a joint 
project.55 
 
By prioritizing buy-in, MIT saw faculty culture change over time and respond more positively to 
sponsored collaborations.  Below are some quotes that highlight the experience of researchers. 
 
(i) One former academic recalls the suspicion originally present among faculty. 
Almost all my research has been supported by industry—but I was an exception 
not the rule.  Most of the faculty have had and still do have their money coming 
from the federal government.  So, there was a suspicion of industry.56 
 
(ii) Then as collaboration increased and faculty concerns were addressed, administrators 
observed a cultural shift: 
Another change is that a larger and larger fraction of them [faculty] are getting 
interested in working with industry and are realizing that you don’t have to sell 
your soul to do so.  And that interaction with industry can be very beneficial to 
the academic process if managed right.  A lot of them used to think that it was 
inherently contaminating.57 
 
(iii) Finally, some researchers’ experience of collaboration acted as an accelerator for 
exposing them to new possibilities. 
It was the most intellectually interesting interaction I had in that period of 
time…because I didn’t have company connections, and there was a whole 
industry side of the (the field).  And, if I hadn’t had that exposure, I would have 
been excluded from that interaction, because I’m not on the board of any small 
companies…this was my access to it.  And, I think, without it I would not have 
been able to keep abreast of what was really happening in the field.58 
 
  
                                                          
55 Hatakenaka, p.108 
56 Hatakenaka, p.104 
57 Ibid. 
58 Hatakenaka, p.101-102 
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Case Study 2—Multi-university Teams 
Team structure and innovation 
An important part of the vision for the Foundation’s convergence center focuses on creating a 
symbiotic relationship between the Triangle universities that will foster multi-disciplinary and 
multi-institutional teams.  Although a great case study on how one institution does research 
differently, the MIT Media Lab does not represent a case study in multi-institutional 
collaboration.  At best, the Media Lab is multi-institutional in that it is between one university 
and many corporations.   
 
However, the Global Convergence Center as envisioned by TUCASI hinges on collaboration 
between several non-profit universities.  The literature is slim on case studies of specific multi-
university collaborations.  However, one can certainly find literature that studies challenges 
facing multi-university collaborations.     
 
In their 2010 article, “The Mechanisms of Collaboration in Inventive Teams: Composition, Social 
Networks, and Geography,” Janet Bercovitz and Maryann Feldman analyze the purpose and 
ideal parameters for productive collaborative teams.  They begin by identifying the goal of 
collaborative, commercially-oriented research teams: creating “an invention that is novel, 
valuable, and non-obvious.”59  In pursuit of this goal, institutions have shifted from individuals 
to research teams as a major source of creativity and innovation.  According to Bercowitz and 
Feldman: 
Innovation is increasingly becoming a team sport.  And like all team sports, 
success is a function of the expertise of the individual players, a solid roster 
enabling coverage of the key positions with the potential of a few stellar 
combinations.60 
 
This analogy of innovation as a team sport asks the question what are traits of successful 
research teams.  Bercovitz and Feldman highlight a few lessons.  For instance, creativity 
                                                          
59 Janet Bercovitz, “The mechanisms of collaboration in inventive teams: composition, social networks, and 
geography,” p.1  
60 Bercovitz, p.12 
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becomes an important element in breaking the silos that inevitably result as scientists become 
more specialized in niche fields.61  New product development relies on inventive effort and 
creativity as integral enablers.  Team size plays an important role as well.  As the complexity of 
research grows, scientists cannot go it alone.  More and more, scientists—especially those in 
the life sciences—rarely engage in research by themselves.62  Based on the number of inventors 
listed on US patents, research team size in America has grown at approximately 17% per 
decade.63 
 
With team size comes also the potential for team diversity.  Diversity in skills and experience 
has aided successful research and development.  The discovery of the Krebs Cycle is one great 
example.  The Krebs Cycle is a key step in the biochemical process of cell respiration, which was 
once a confounding scientific problem.  The two discoverers of this important step in 
respiration were Frederic Lawrence Holmes and Hans Krebs.64  Holmes was a chemist by 
training and Krebs was a doctor with training in biology.65  According to Holmes, Krebs brought 
fresh perspective to their research because Krebs lacked training in organic chemistry and 
therefore, was unconstrained by its conventions.66  He lacked the biases that limited the types 
of questions biochemists would ask when attempting to understand cell respiration.  The 
diversity of skills and experience gave their team an advantage in combining their abilities in a 
unique way to produce more successful research.67  Understandably, Bercovitz and Feldman 
find that teams with diversity of knowledge have a higher chance producing a patentable or 
licensable invention.68 
 
Team composition can be divided into three broad categories: 
1. Minimal diversity: team members are from a single knowledge area. 
                                                          
61 Bercovitz, p.1 
62 Bercovitz, p.11 
63 Bercovitz, p.1 
64 Bercovitz, p.2 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Bercovitz, p.11 
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2. Moderate diversity: team members may be from various knowledge areas, but they are 
from knowledge areas that are commonly coupled together. 
3. Maximum diversity: team members come from many knowledge areas that have rarely 
been grouped together.69 
Whether there is a sweet spot for the degree of diversity in a team is unclear.  However, these 
categories of team composition provide an approach for determining how out-of-the-box a 
team is willing to be in pursuit of creativity and innovation.  The MIT Media Lab is the 
quintessence of the third, most diverse category. 
 
Collaboration and government 
In their 2007 article, “Coordination Costs and Project Outcomes in Multi-university 
Collaborations,” Jonathon Cummings and Sara Kiesler discuss university collaboration.  They 
describe the goals of research collaboration as achieving “outcomes that include producing new 
knowledge, creating new research tools, training and educating students, and forming 
partnerships with institutions in the larger society, such as government agencies, museums, or 
schools.”70   
 
The United States government incentivizes university collaboration.  The National Science 
Foundation, for example, funds projects in interdisciplinary research through initiatives like the 
Information Technology Research (ITR) Program.71  The ITR was a 5-year program that 
supported interdisciplinary information technology research and education projects.72  The 
program was a large investment from the government, increasing investment from $90 million 
in the year 2000, to $295 million four years later.  The National Institutes of Health has 
incentivized collaborative research through major initiatives like the Human Genome Project, 
which spanned across many research groups.73  The US National Academy of Sciences also 
                                                          
69 Bercovitz, p.2 
70 Cummings, “Coordination costs and project outcomes in multi-university collaborations,” p.1621. 
71 Cumming, p.1620-21 
72 Cummings, p.1623 
73 Cummings, p.1620-21 
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promotes collaboration by citing major discoveries in neuroscience, nanotechnology, and 
bioinformatics as outcomes of collaborative research.74     
 
The big coordination challenge 
With the advent of increased collaboration has come the challenge of coordination.  One 
problem is that more and more projects are conducted by teams that are geographically spread 
apart.  Scientific labs can be spread across continents, and open source collaborations (e.g. 
software development) can have contributors from all over the world.  Scientists and 
innovators collaborate across geographic, organizational, and technological boundaries because 
they can mutually achieve synergies and cost savings.  This began after World War II, when 
researchers began to take on more complex scientific inquiries and needed to share the cost of 
expensive equipment and specialists.75 
 
The Bercovitz and Cummings papers both emphasize the challenge of increased coordination 
requirements.  Bercovitz states that as a research team spans more organizational boundaries, 
coordination becomes harder to pull off, and the probability of innovation diminishes.76  In his 
study of 491 research collaborations, half of which included more than one university, 
Cummings stated that coordination costs are a significant obstacle to successful outcomes.77  
However, Cummings goes a step further.  He argues that multi-university collaborations impose 
much higher coordination costs than individual university projects, despite the advantages of 
shared resources, experts, and funding incentives.78  Cummings’ research found that multi-
university collaborations were significantly less successful than single university projects in the 
short-run.79  The data show that the decline in productivity, with respect to knowledge, tools, 
and outcomes, began to show even with collaborations between two universities. 
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A theory called “the knowledge-based view” sheds light on why multi-university collaborations 
aren’t inherently better than single university collaborations.  The knowledge-based view 
developed out of the private sector from analyses of the classic “grow versus buy” question.  
Companies, when faced with an absent but needed capability, have the choice of growing the 
capability in-house or purchasing it.80  According to the theory, research teams better at 
integrating the diversity will produce more successful outcomes.81  Thus if multi-institutional 
teams don’t effectively address the high coordination costs they are predisposed to 
encountering, then they are more likely to fail than their single institution colleagues, with 
lower coordination costs.   
 
Cummings provides examples of the types of challenges multi-institutional teams face.  For 
instance, universities often have different pay scales for graduate students and faculty, 
different requirements for joint appointments, and different cultural norms.82  University 
researchers may disagree where to publish because their respective universities may categorize 
top tier journals and conferences differently.  Additionally, university collaborations are often 
separated by geography, which can slow down debate, consensus-building, and delay catching 
problems.83  Cummings provides a litany of research that illustrates the variety of 
communication problems observed in collaborative endeavors. 
When multiple universities are involved in a project, complexity increases and 
the difficulty of coordination activities increases (Hagstrom 1964; Hobday, 2000). 
Distance reduces opportunities for spontaneous, informal talk in a shared social 
setting (Kiesler and Cummings, 2002). Compared with single university projects, 
projects with investigators at different universities are likely to have more 
difficulty fostering a collegial social environment (Kraut et al., 2002; Nardi and 
Whittaker, 2002), building common ground (Clark and Brennan, 1991), 
maintaining awareness of what others are doing (Weisband, 2002), and making 
rapid adjustments to surprises (Olson and Olson, 2000). Allen’s (1977) rule of 
thumb is that co-workers should be no more than 30mapart, beyond which 
collaboration effectiveness declines precipitously (see Kraut et al., 1990).84 
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Due to these high coordination costs, the knowledge-based view finds that developing 
expertise in-house at one university is the best option when that expertise will be used often 
and is unlikely to be copied by other universities.  On the other hand, research alliances and 
collaboration is the best option when it won’t be used often, won’t be copied by others, and 
won’t be inexpensive to develop.85 
 
Another solution to mitigating high coordination costs is increasing socialization between team 
members.  Data suggest that reinforcing socialization across the team through repeated 
interactions, communication activities, and alignment on processes reduces coordination 
costs.86  Additionally, co-location could be another solution.  Cummings cites a plethora of 
literature that state alternatives to co-location aren’t valid substitutes.  He writes: 
For purposes of coordination, technology is an imperfect substitute for 
collocation. In studies of business and research projects with dispersed 
members, researchers have discovered project delays (Espinosa and Carmel, 
2004; Herbsleb et al., 2000), misunderstandings (Cramton, 2001), institutional 
rivalries (Armstrong and Cole, 2002), free riding (Weisband, 2002), distractions 
from local institutional priorities (Mark et al.,1999), inconsistent procedures 
across institutions (Curtis et al., 1988), and failures to share information and 
communicate effectively (Hinds and Mortensen, 2005; Hoegland Proserpio, 
2004).87 
 
  
                                                          
85 Cummings, p.1621 
86 Bercowitz, p.11, Cummings, p.1625 
87 Cummings, p.1622 
22 
 
Case Study 3—RTI International 
The story of how RTI International began provides insight on how a local player, with RTP roots, 
successfully developed itself as a cutting-edge research institution.  By understanding how RTI 
began, the Research Triangle Foundation can have a better understanding of how the Global 
Convergence Center may get off the ground. 
 
Over fifty years, RTI has built an impressive reputation.  With its mission for improving the 
human condition, it sits on a campus of 180 acres.  It has conducted over 10,000 projects for 
hundreds of private and public sector clients all over the world.  RTI has around 3,700 
employees working on over 1,000 projects in over 75 countries.88  RTI’s research areas cover a 
wide set of subjects like agriculture, economics, education, medicine, public policy, energy, 
technology, the environment, and transportation.89   
 
RTI has evolved over the decades.  When it won its first contract, statistics was RTI’s only area 
of expertise.  However, over the last 50 years, RTI has grown and expanded.  Through the 
1960s, building off of President Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” RTI spread into social 
sciences work.  By the 1980s, during President Reagan’s era of budget cuts on quality-of-life 
initiatives and greater defense spending, RTI moved into health care, space, technology, and 
cultural dimensions of the military.  Then in the 1990s, RTI further advanced its work on the 
environment with research on water and air pollution.  As of the 2000s, RTI’s international work 
has been its fastest growing segment of contracts.90  As of recent, RTI’s largest area of study is 
health research, where it has a wide breadth of sub-specialties.91   
   
With its wide variety of research capabilities, RTI’s success is partly due to its multi-disciplinary 
approach to client problems.92  This approach helps to create more imaginative and thoroughly 
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examined solutions.  For instance, one team of researchers used data mining and analytics to 
develop software that helped law enforcement increase public safety and get more out of 
limited resources.93  Another example is of a team that brokered a public-private partnership to 
shepherd a new tuberculosis drug, PA-824, to clinical trials.94 
 
When RTI was founded in 1958, the physical area that RTI now comprises consisted only of 
open fields and pine trees.  Local business, political, non-profit leaders decided to improve the 
local economy by stemming the “brain drain” of educated professionals who had been trained 
in the Triangle universities.  These pioneers proposed creating a business park (RTP), with a 
research institute at its center.95  The goal was to improve economic development by creating 
jobs through research and innovation.96  Thus the Research Triangle Park and the Research 
Triangle Institute came into being. 
 
RTI’s first president: George Herbert 
George Herbert became the first president and employee of RTI in 1958.  After earning an 
electrical engineering degree from the US Naval Academy in 1945, Herbert, on a chance 
encounter, met the executive director of the nascent Stanford Research Institute (today, SRI 
International), Jesse Hobson. Hobson invited him to work as an administrative assistant, and 
Herbert accepted.97  Over several years, Herbert steadily rose through the ranks to eventually 
become executive associate director, the second person in charge at the institute.98   After a 
short stint as treasurer of the American and Foreign Power Company located in New York, he 
was invited by George Watts Hill, the chairman of the Research Triangle Committee, to head 
RTI.99  When Herbert took the reins at RTI, the only assets in RTI’s hands was the promise of a 
157-acre site and a $500,000 grant from Archie Davis.100 
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The role of renowned researchers in winning RTI’s first contracts 
Two major events helped RTI get on its feet.  The first was RTI’s initial contract and the second 
was a grant to support basic research in polymers.  In 1959, 3 staff members from UNC’s 
Institute of Statistics transferred to RTI.  They came to support RTI in fulfilling a contract with 
the state of Tennessee to analyze morbidity data from the city of Nashville.101  The contract was 
worth $4,500.102  A month after the 3 staff members joined RTI, Gertrude Cox, the founder of 
UNC’s Institute of Statistics, joined the team on a part-time basis.103  Cox’s association with RTI 
was crucial in developing the young institute’s research reputation.  Cox was the first woman 
full professor at North Carolina State University, and later the first person to lead a university 
department of statistics.104  Cox’s reputation could create a regular flow of contract research.  
In fact, of RTI’s first twenty research contracts, 18 of them were statistics projects.105 
 
The second major event was the Camille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation’s $2.5 million grant to 
RTI.  The Dreyfus funded the institute to support a 10-year study in polymer chemistry and 
physics.106  This became the second major area of expertise for RTI.  RTI’s polymer lab became 
the first in the US dedicated solely to its research.107  However the Dreyfus Foundation’s grant 
was contingent on RTI hiring an internationally renowned polymer scientist to head the lab.108  
It took a year and a half, and more than 18 candidates, before Herbert settled on the European 
Anton Peterlin.109  Peterlin was a theoretical physicist and mathematician who was Yugoslav 
and jailed by the Nazis during World War II.110  Peterlin not only accepted the invitation to lead 
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the polymer lab, but played a critical role in drawing other renowned European polymer 
scientists to join his team.111   
 
The Tennessee contract and the Dreyfus grant got RTI off its feet.  RTI learned important 
lessons in recruiting renowned scientists and leveraging their reputation to win contracts.  In 
the case of RTI’s famous Natural Products Laboratory, RTI snapped up the renowned scientist 
Monroe Wall when the opportunity arose.  In the early 1960s, Wall was a Ph.D. scientist at the 
US Department of Agriculture (USDA), where he was in charge of the plant steroid research 
section.112  Although he had recently found some fascinating cancer-fighting plant samples, the 
USDA declined to fund further research.  The National Institutes of Health offered to fund his 
research on a contractual basis if he could assemble a team and find a lab elsewhere.113  Wall 
found that lab and team at RTI, where Wall led the Natural Products Laboratory and went on to 
discover camptothecin and taxol—two early treatments in the history of anti-cancer 
therapies.114 
 
RTI continued to benefit from its relationships with Triangle university researchers.  Arthur 
Menius, the dean of the physics department at North Carolina State University, was familiar 
with the Atomic Energy Commission and therefore knew that it wanted to fund the 
development of research centers focusing on radioisotope applications.115  In Menius’ proposal 
to the commission, he argued that RTI would be the best location for funds because it could 
capitalize on Triangle universities’ synergies.  He said the Triangle universities could “offer what 
one institution finds most difficult—the engineering and industrial knowledge supported by 
research and advanced concepts nurtured in an academic atmosphere…tempered by close 
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cooperation in a small geographic area.”116  In 1959, the commission awarded RTI a $160,000 
grant to fund a radioisotope lab at the institute.117 
 
George Herbert’s strategy to hire famous scientists and attract business was key to growing RTI.  
According to Herbert, “We built RTI from the top down, first hiring key people who could 
assemble top-notch staffs and establish high-quality research programs in their respective 
fields.”118  As a Triangle institution, RTI benefitted from the interest that researchers from the 
Triangle universities had in working at the young organization.  For them, RTI offered an 
opportunity to work in an environment different from their university settings. 
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Best Practices 
We offer the best practices below based on the three case studies we examine in this paper.  The case 
study we drew the practice from is cited in parentheses. 
 
1. Select a leader for the Convergence Center that has deep relationships with the Triangle 
universities and has worked across academia and industry. (MIT Media Lab) 
 
Reasoning: Negroponte’s alumnus connection and his ability to function comfortably in both 
academic settings and corporate boardrooms enabled him to speak convincingly to the Media 
Lab’s multiple stakeholders. 
 
2. Develop a unifying vision for research that the Convergence Center will host. (MIT Media Lab) 
 
Reasoning: Negroponte’s convergence model maintained thematic alignment between the 
Media Lab’s diverse projects and promoted cutting-edge, anti-disciplinary research. 
 
3. Ensure researchers and administrators have ample opportunity to develop relationships with 
industry (MIT Media Lab) 
 
Reasoning: The opportunity to interact with industry represents new work experience for many 
researchers and the resulting relationships lay the groundwork for future collaboration. 
 
4. Reduce faculty concern about working with industry by creating processes that match faculty 
interests with market or industry needs. (MIT Media Lab) 
 
Reasoning: Since losing autonomy to corporate partners can be a major faculty concern, finding 
a match between faculty and industry interest creates alignment and reduces barriers to 
collaboration. 
 
5. Reduce and eliminate the organizational boundaries that researchers must work across. 
(multi-university teams) 
 
Reasoning: The more boundaries (e.g. geographic, resource, employer) a research team must 
work across, the smaller its chance of producing innovative results. 
 
6. Recruit diverse teams from uncommonly grouped areas of research. (multi-university teams) 
 
Reasoning: As innovation becomes a team sport, greater member diversity and novel groupings 
of members increase the probability of creative production. 
 
7. Recruit prestigious researchers and leverage their reputation to attract more talent and 
research dollars. (RTI) 
 
Reasoning: This was Herbert’s strategy when he joined RTI and it proved successful in building an 
extremely talented staff and winning contracts and grants. 
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8. Ensure that the Global Convergence Center offers a unique research opportunity that cannot 
be found at local universities (RTI) 
 
Reasoning: Local researchers came to RTI and funneled work toward it because RTI offered work 
opportunities that were different from their respective institutions. 
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Conclusion 
An examination of the literature on cutting-edge research, collaboration, and the leveraging of  RTP 
talent can produce useful insights to guide how the Research Triangle Foundation moves forward with 
the Global Convergence Center.  However, this study brings up further issues that the Foundation will 
need to carefully analyze.  First, who will be the Global Convergence Center’s Nicholas Negroponte?  The 
right type of leadership will be a linchpin in the center’s successful growth.  Second, how will the 
Foundation recruit experts from outside the Triangle?  The Convergence Center may serve to unite the 
research strengths of the Triangle universities, but neglecting external talent may be a lost opportunity 
for the center.  Third, when researchers from different universities come together, what will be the 
organizational boundaries?  For example, will a team represent Duke, UNC, and NCSU (thereby, 
increasing organizational boundaries), or will the team assume a new, common identity independent of 
the members’ original institutions?  Finally, what will the role of industry look like at the center?   
 
The Foundation can investigate these questions by networking closely with administrators and 
researchers at the Triangle universities.  Getting their input will further sharpen the vision for the center.  
Speaking with the local venture capital community would also help the Foundation understand how to 
increase the business viability of the research conducted at the center.  Finally, the Foundation should 
continue studying comparable organizations to gain more insights.  In addition to the organizations 
here, the Foundation can explore the story of the Georgia Research Alliance and the Stevenage 
Bioscience Catalyst Open Innovation Campus in the United Kingdom.   
 
The Global Convergence Center represents a great opportunity to grow the economic and reputational 
footprint of the Research Triangle Park.  We hope that our research will play a part in the one-day 
historic story of the Convergence Center.  
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Appendix – A 
MIT Media Lab Research Groups119 
 
 
Director Research Topic Description 
1 Rosalind Picard Affective computing How new technologies can help people better communicate, understand, and respond to affective information 
2 Hugh Herr Biomechatronics How technology can be used to enhance human physical capability 
3 Ramesh Raskar Camera culture How to create new ways to capture and share visual information 
4 Kent Larson Changing places How new strategies for architectural design, mobility systems, and networked intelligence can make possible dynamic, evolving places that respond to the complexities of life 
5 Ethan Zuckerman Civic media How to design, create, deploy, and assess tools and processes that foster civic participation and the flow of information between and within communities 
6 Deb Roy Cognitive machines 
How to build machines that learn to use language in human-like ways, and develop tools 
and models to better understand how children learn to communicate and how adults 
behave 
7 Hiromi Ozaki Design fictions How to provoke discussion about the social, cultural, and ethical implications of new technologies 
8 Pattie Maes Fluid interfaces How to integrate the world of information and services more naturally into our daily physical lives, enabling insihgt, inspiration, and interpersonal connections 
9 Leah Buechley High-low tech How to engage diverse audiences in creating their own technology by situating computation in new contexts and building tools to democratize engineering 
10 Alex Pentland Human dynamics How social networks can influence our lives in business, health, and governance, as well as technology adoption and diffusion 
11 Henry Holtzman Information  ecology 
How to create seamless and pervasive connections between our physical environments and 
information resources 
12 Mitchel Resnick Lifelong  kindergarten How to engage people in creative learning experiences 
13 Cesar Hidalgo Macro connections How to transform data into knowledge 
14 Neri Oxman Mediated matter How digital and fabrication technologies mediate between matter and environment to radically transform the design and construction of objects, buildings, and systems 
15 Joseph Jacobson Molecular machines How to engineer at the limits of complexity with molecular-scale parts 
16 V. Michael Bove Object-based media How sensing, understanding, and new interface technologies can change everyday life, the way s in which we communicate with one another, storytelling, and entertainment 
17 Tod Machover Opera of the future How musical composition, performance, and instrumentation can lead to innovative forms of expression, learning, and health    
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18 Cyntha Breazeal Personal robots 
How to build socially engaging robots and interactive technologies that provide people with 
long-term social and emotional support to help people live healthier lives, connect with 
others, and learn better 
19 Kevin Slavin Playful systems How to design systems that become experiences by transacting mere utility and usability 
20 Joseph Paradiso Responsive  environments How sensor networks augment and mediate human experience, interaction, and perception 
21 Sepandar Kamvar Social computing How to design large-scale social systems 
22 Henry Lieberman Software agents How software can act as an assistant to the user rather than a tool, by learning from interaction and by proactively anticipating the user's needs 
23 Chris Schmandt Speech + mobility How speech technologies and portable devices can enhance communication 
24 Edward Boyden Synthetic  neurobiology 
How to engineer intelligent neurotechnologies to repair pathology, augment cognition, and 
reveal insights into the human condition 
25 Hiroshi Ishii Tangible media How to design seamless interfaces between humans, digital information and the physical environment 
26 Andrew Lippman Viral spaces How to make scalable systems that enhance how we learn from and experience real spaces 
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Appendix—B  
Wiesner Building, MIT Media Lab 
 
 
 
 
  
33 
 
Appendix—C 
Works Cited 
 
Banham, Russ. Impact on a changing world; RTI International at 50. Old Saybrook, Connecticut: 
Greenwich Publishing Group, Inc., 2008. 
 
Bercovitz, Janet and Maryann Feldman. “The mechanisms of collaboration in inventive teams: 
composition, social networks, and geography.” Research Policy. RESPOL-2495. 2010, p.1-13. 
 
Brand, Stewart.  The Media Lab: inventing the future at MIT. New York: Penguin Books, 1988. 
 
Cummings, Jonathon and Sara Kiesler. “Coordination costs and project outcomes in multi-university 
collaborations.” Research Policy. 36. 2007, p.1620-1634. 
 
Dubberly, Hugh. “Extending Negroponte’s Model of Convergence.” Interactions. Volume 18, Issue 5. 
September/October 2011, p.74-79. 
 
Hatakenaka, Sachi. University-industry partnerships in MIT, Cambridge, and Tokyo: storytelling across 
boundaries. New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004. 
 
MIT Media Lab. “MIT Media Lab.” Facebook. Accessed March 3, 2014. 
<https://www.facebook.com/mitmedialab/info>. 
 
MIT Media Lab. “MIT Media Lab.” MIT School of Architecture + Planning.  Accessed March 3, 2014. < 
http://www.media.mit.edu/>. 
 
Ohnesorge, Lauren. “Convergence center in middle of RTP’s extreme makeover.” Triangle Business 
Journal. September 27, 2013. 
 
RTI International. “About RTI.” Accessed March 3, 2014. <http://www.rti.org/page.cfm/About_RTI 
>.  
 
Triangle Universities Center for Advanced Studies Inc. (TUCASI). “Project Archie.” Whitepaper. 
[no date available]. 
 
Wikipedia. “Nicholas Negroponte.” Accessed March 3, 2014. < 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_Negroponte>. 
 
Wikipedia. “Jerome Wiesner.” Accessed March 3, 2014. < 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerome_Wiesner>. 
